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3rd Party Defendants (
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

DAVID H. BYBEE
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Action was brought in the lower court by the
Plaintiff as holder in due course; and without
recourse, of a Promissory Note and Contract
signed by the Defendants

and Appellants and

made payable to the third party Defendants and
Respondent. , in the amount and according to
their terms.
Appellants admitted liability upon the note
and contract, but alleged that Respondent had
agreed to pay the obligation or at least to hold
the Defendants harmless upon the obligation.
The Respondents defended upon the ground that
the document wherein the third party Defendants
had agreed to save Appellants harmless was obtained by fraud.
Testimony was presented by the Appellants,
solely for the purpose of negating the allegations
of fraud.

No finding of fraud was made by Trial

Court.
The Lower Court dismissed the third party
complaint upon the grounds that the Respondent
did not understand the meaning of the word
"obligation", as used in the instrument signed
by Appellant and Respondent.
It is from the Court's judgment dismissing

the third party complaint that Appellants now
appeal.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

1.

The court erred in ruling that a person

taking part in a bilateral contract is entitled to
enforce his individual standard of meaning to the
contract.
ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court erred in ruling that a

person taking part in a bilateral contract is entitled to enforce his individual standards of
meaning to the contract.
When a person takes part in a bilateral act,
for example, a transaction in which other persons share, he must accept a common standard.

!l~o.

He cannot claim to enforce his individual standard of meaning.

Quoted from Wigmore on

Evidence, Volume 9, Page 216-217, Paragraph

l

room

,

,ilie .. ,

2466.

]'

.,

.

, o··.

12, Amer. Juris. Title: Contracts, page
751, Paragraph 229, Necessity of Interpretation:
Plain Language.

"Words are to receive their

plain and literal meaning even though the intention of the party drawing the contract may
have been different from that expressed.

It is

said that the agreement of the parties is to be
ascertained by the plain language used by them,
no matter what the intentions rna y have been.
Presumptively, the intent of the parties to a
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jtte;:

contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary
meaning of their language referrable to it, and
such meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by
the Courts through construction"

0

This is an elementary and universal rule, and
it would appear redundant to cite cases to support
it.

However, the following cases from our own

jurisdiction are cited for this purpose o
"Intent of parties to clear an unambiguous contract must be determined from the language thereof" o
Middleton-vs-Evans, 45 Pac. 2do 570-86 Utah,

396.
"Where a writing is clear and plain on its
face and not ambiguous or doubtful, there is no
room for construction, but resort must be had to
the language employed in determining the meaning or intention of the writing".

Richlands Irri-

gation Company, -vs -Westview Irrigation Company,
80 Pac. 2d. 458, 96 Utah 403.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the lower courts
order dismissing the third party complaint
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID H. BYBEE
Attorney for Appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DEC 1 I ·19111
LAW UBRAIH

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

FILED

THE CONTINENTAL BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, a
Utah banking corporation, ---~-- --------------------- -----· ___ _
PlaintiJJ; .Supreme Court, Ut , ~VS.

DAVID H. BYBEE and VERDA
M BYBEE,
Case No. 8500
Defendants and Appellants,
vs.
W. H. ADAMS CARPET
COMPANY,
Third Party Defendants
and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ALBERT J. COLTON of
FABIAN, CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I1-JDEX
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------POINT I. THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 18, 1955
IS NOT CLEAR, PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS. ---------------------------------------------------------------------POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES WAS REASON ABLE. ________________________
(a) It is not the only writing.________________________________
(b) The respondent's interpretation leads to
an unreasonable result. -------------------------------(c) Appellant did not request return of the
promissory note. -------------------------------------------(d) Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement of
May 18 are merely mutual releases.____________
(e) Findings of fact of the trial court shall
be set aside only if clearly against the
weight of the evidence. -----------------------------------(f) The absence of an express finding as to
fraud does not prejudice appellant_____________
CON CL USI 0 N --------------------------------------------------------------------

1
5
6
6
10
10
11
11
12
12
12
13

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Clegg v. Schvaneveldt, (1932) 79 Utah 195 8 P. 2d 620
In Re Akers Will (1902) 77 N.Y. Supp. 643 ________________
McDonald v. Loomis, (1925), 233 Mich. 174, 206
NW 348 -------------------------------------------------------------------Morley v. Willden, (1951) 120 Utah 423, 235 P. 2d 500
Perry v. McConkie (1953) 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d
852 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------Richards Irr. Co. v. Westview Co., (1938) 96 Utah
403, 80 P. 2d 458 ------------------------------------------------

9
9
9
13
13
7

STATUTES
UCA, 1953, Sec. 60-5-7 ----------------------------------------------------

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE CONTINENTAL BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, a
Utah banking corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID H. BYBEE and VERDA
M. BYBEE,
Case No. 8500
Defendants and Appellants,
vs.
W. H. ADAMS CARPET
COMPANY,
Third Party Defendants
and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is submitted that the inadequacy of appellant's statement of facts makes a restatement necessary.
Respondent operates a carpet business. In
February of 1955, it entered into an agreement
with appellants to sell and install in their home
carpeting of a certain designated type. The agreed
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purchase price was $607.00. Appellant paid $177.00
in cash and for the balance of $430.00 signed a
promissory note with respondent as payee, which
note included interest. Respondent discounted this
note to The Continental Bank and Trust Company and the parties stipulated that the Bank took
the note as a holder in due course. Appellants knew
of this transfer and made one payment to the bank
of $74.86 ( R. p. 55), leaving a balance unpaid on the
note of $37 4.30.
Subsequently, appellant became dissatisfied
with the carpeting which was installed. They
claimed that it had an unsightly seam along one wall
and that they had ordered wall to wall carpeting
without seams. Several visits were made to appellant's home by agents of the respondent, in an attempt to adjust the matter. These negotiations included, according to the testimony of respondent's
manager, the sending to appellant's home of a crew
of men who reburied the carpet (R. p. 38) and
later an offer to take back the carpet and refund
appellant's money. (R. p. 43) Finally, the parties
thought they had reached a settlement. On May 18,
1955, respondent's agent, Thompson, took over to
appellant David H. Bybee the check for $100.00.
It was Thompson's testimony that he understood
the agreement of settlement to be that respondent
was to pay appellant $100.00 which would be a full
2
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adjustment of the defect in the carpet and that appellant would keep the carpet and pay off the outstanding promissory note to the Bank. ( R. p. 44 ;
p. 54)
Appellant David H. Bybee is a practicing Attorney. When Thompson came to his office with the
check Bybee told him he had drawn up a paper
which set forth their understanding and asked
Thompson to sign. Thompson testified that he
glanced over it, signed and handed Bybee the check.
( R. p. 45) The agreement reads as follows:
"Agreement"
"THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into
by and between W. H. ADAMS & SONS of
Salt Lake County, Utah, and DAVID H. BYBEE of Davis County, Utah.
"WITNESSETH:
"THAT WHEREAS, DAVID H. BYBEE
has heretofore purchased a carpet from W. H.
ADAMS & SONS which carpet has heretofore been installed and placed in the living
room of the home of Mr. and Mrs. David H.
Bybee at 6885 Orchard Drive, Bountiful,
Utah, and a contract for the payment of the
unpaid purchase price has been entered into;
"AND WHEREAS, he is dissatisfied with
said carpet.
"AND WHEREAS, W. H. ADAMS & SONS
are desirous of making an amicable settlement: IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED:
3
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1.

That W. H. ADAMS & SONS will
pay to DAVID H. BYBEE the sum
of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars.
2. Will give DAVID H. BYBEE a Bill
of Sale for the carpet showing complete payment and vesting the title
of the property in DAVID H. BYBEE.
3. Will cancel any and all evidences of
any indebtedness by DAVID H. BYBEE to the W. H. ADAMS & SONS,
their assignees, or transferees, or
agents.
4. DAVID H. BYBEE will give and
does by these presents give to W. H.
ADAMS & SONS a complete release
from any and all liability, damages,
actions or any claim that he may
have against W. H. ADAMS & SONS
by reason of having purchased the
aforesaid carpet.
DATED May 18, 1955.
W. H. ADAMS & SONS
By /s/ C. M. Thompson
/s/ David H. Bybee
DAVID H. BYBEE"

Thompson had written on the back of the check he
handed Bybee the following:
"In full settlement on adjustment on carpet installed in the Bybee residence."
Bybee subsequently endorsed the check below
this writing.
4
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Later, Bybee refused to make payment to the
Bank and the Bank commenced action on the promissory note. Appellant filed a general denial in that
action and filed a third party complaint against
respondent alleging the execution of an agreement
"that third party defendant would assume and pay
the obligation to The Continental Bank and Trust
Company herein sued upon and would hold the defendant harmless from any action by any person
based upon the said promissory note." (R. p. 3) The
Bybees alleged that respondent maliciously refused
to make payment as agreed and claimed relief from
the bank's claim, for attorney's fees and for punitive damages.
Judgment vvas given the Bank against the Bybees which judgment has been satisfied. After testimoney, the trial court found that there was no provision in the written agreement, (Ex. 3) or was
there any agreement which provided that the carpet
company would assume the promissory note then
held by the bank or that the carpet company would
hold the Bybees harmless from any damages based
on this note.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 18, 1955
IS NOT CLEAR, PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETA5
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TION OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS
REASONABLE.

(a)
(b)
(c)

It is not the only writing.
The respondent's interpretation leads to
an unreasonable result.
Appellant did not request return of the
promissory note.

(d)

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement of
May 18 are merely mutual releases.

(e)

Findings of fact of the trial court shall
be set aside only if clearly against the
weight of the evidence.

(f)

The absence of an express finding as to
fraud does not prejudice appellant.
ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 18, 1955
IS NOT CLEAR, PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

The Bybees contend that in signing the agreement of May 18, 1955, Adams Carpet Company
agreed not only to let them keep the carpet, but to
pay the Bybees $100.00 and to relieve them of their
obligation on the promissory note. In other words,
the Bybees contend that Adams Carpet company
agreed that because of a seam along the wall, that
they would reduce a $607.00 sale to $77.00.
Appellants, in their laconic brief, rely upon the
rule that a court must resort to the language of the
6
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instrument alone in determining the meaning of the
parties. Of course, as this court has held, this rule
applies only "where a writing is clear and plain on
its face and not ambiguous or doubtful." Richards
Irr. Co. vs. Westview Co. (1938) 96 Utah, 403, 80
P. 2d, 458. The instant case does not contain facts
which bring it within this rule.
To begin with, the agreement drafted by Bybee
was not the only writing executed on that date by
the parties. Bybee endorsed the $100.00 check, which
contained an unconditional release above his signature. There was no reference there to the asumption of a debt to a third party. This writing is
completely consistent with the carpet company's interpretation of their agreement. Even if another
writing conflicted with this one, would there be any
reason why the agreement set forth on the check is
not just as effective? In that event, we would have
conflicting documents and the court would have to
look to the underlying facts to determine the true
agreements of the parties.
But it is submitted that the recitation on the
check and the more elaborate agreement drafted by
Bybee are not inconsistent. Neither contains an
agreement to assume a promissory note. The Bybees
contend that the carpet company agreed with them
in writing that the carpet company would "assume
and pay the obligation to The Continental Bank and
7
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Trust Company herein sued upon and would hold the
defendant harmless from any action from any person, based upon the said promissory note." ( 3rd
Party complaint, R. p. 3.)
The only part of the agreement drafted by Bybee, which might conceivably refer to the agreement alleged in the Bybees' complaint is paragraph
3, which provides :
"It is mutually agreed: * * *
3.

Will cancel any and all evidences of any indebtedness by David H. Bybee to the W. H.
Adams and Sons, their assigns, or transferees or agents."

The ambiguity of paragraph 3 is most clearly
shown by the fact that the Bybees, in attempting to
re-state what they claim the paragraph to mean,
had to use completely different and more concise
language (we refer to Mr. Bybee's letter of June
8, 1955, ex. 7, and paragraph II of the Third party
complaint (R. p. 3)). These show that Bybee could
clearly say what he meant when he wanted to do so.
The trial court found that this sentence did
not refer to the promissory note held by The Continental Bank (R. p. 59-60). A word-by-word
analysis shows the propriety of this decision.
The Bybee-drafted instrument provides that the
parties will "cancel any and all evidence of any in8
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debtedness." The word "cancel" means to physically
annul or destroy. The word has been so interpreted
by several courts, including this one. Thus, in Clegg
v. Schvaneveldt, ( 1932), 79 Utah 195 8 P. 2d 620,
621 this court said:
"The word 'cancel' means to make void
or invalid. It is synonomous with annul,
abolish, reject, abrogate, repeal, make void,
do away with, etc."
A New York court has held that there can be
no such thing as a "cancellation" of an instrument
either as a physical fact or as a legal inference
unless the instrument itself is in some form defaced
or obliterated. In Re Akers Will (1902), 77 N.Y.
Supp. 643, 646. The Supreme Court of Michigan has
held that to determine whether a note is cancelled
within the meaning of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law, the court shall look to the act of destruction of the instrument, and not the intent of
the parties to make a gift or release. McDonald v.
Loomis, ( 1925), 233 Mich. 174, 206 N. W. 348.
To "cancel" implies therefor, a thing within the
control of the person cancelling.
One cannot physically deal with something he
does not have in his posession or control. The promissory note was held by the Continental Bank. The
carpet company could not have cancelled it if it
had wished.
9
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Even more clearly, the word "cancel" does not
imply the taking of affirmative action to hold the
Bybees harmless from subsequent litigation.
"Evidence of indebtedness" is a legal term of
art meant to cover all sorts of obligations. There was
no need of such "legalese" in this case. There was
only one obligation outstanding-the promissory
note held by The Continen tal Bank. If the drafter
meant to refer to this, he should have said so. In
the light of the circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume a desire on the part of the drafter
to obfuscate or to make less obvious.
Particularly in light of the general rule interpreting a contract against the person who drew
it, there can be little question but that the writings
of the parties were not clear and unambiguous.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS
REASONABLE.

Where the wording of a contract is not clear
and unambiguous, the trial court may look at all
the facts and circumstances to determine the intent
of the parties.
(a)

It is not the only writing .

...

As pointed out above, the agreement drafted by
Bybee, is of course, not the only writing involved in
10
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this case. Bybee endorsed the $100.00 check which
contained a clause a clear release with no provision
for any assumption of any indebtedness to a third
party. The recitation above Bybee's endorsement is
cons istent with the trial court's interpretation of
the parties of May 18, 1955. To accept the Bybee
interpretation would mean to ignore this recitation.
(b)

The respondent's interpretation leads to
an unreasonable result.

To assume that the carpet company, because of
a minor flaw in installation would all but give the
carpet away, is to assume the ridiculous. The Bybees claim breach of warranty. Their possible
remedies under the law are to seek either ( 1) diminution in price, (2) damages, if consequential,
or ( 3) rescission, by returning the article. (Sec.
60-5-7 UCA '53)
There is no evidence of consequential damage.
Appellant did not seek to rescind. To assume that a
carpet company would concede that a $607.00 carpet job has been reduced in value to $77.00 because
of a seam which showed, is to put little faith in the
perennial optimism of the American salesman.
(c)

Appellant did not request return of the
promissory note.

Mr. Bybee is a lawyer who knows that the most
effective way to provide for payment of a promis11
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sory note by Adams, would have been simply torequire Adams to deliver the original note to him.
Not only was no such provision made, but the agreement makes no reference at all to the disposition of
the promissory note.
(d)

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the agreement of
May 18, -are merely mutual releases.

Respondent's manager Thompson was a layman. He hurriedly read through the proposed agreement. A cursory examination of paragraphs 3 and 4
would lead one untrained in verbal subtlety to assume that it was merely a mutual release of rights
by both parties against each other. That Thompson
understood it to be so is shown by his testimony and
the writing on his check. Also, it is the most obvious
interpretation to be given.
(e)

Findings of fact of the Trial Court shall
be set aside only if clearly against the
weight of the evidence.

The trial court heard all of the testimony and
observed the witnesses and parties. On the basis of
all of the evidence, the court ruled as to the intent
of the parties and the meaning of their agreements.
Even if another court may have decided otherwise
on the same evidence, there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the trial court's finding.
As the record clearly can support such a finding, it
12
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cannot be set aside on appeal. Perry v. M cConkie,
(1953) 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852; Morley v.
Willden, et al., (1951, 120 Utah 423, 235 P. 2d 500.
(f)

The absence of an express finding as to
fraud does not prejudice appellant.

Appellant mentions that the trial court made
no finding as to fraud. The carpet company, in addition to denying that there was an agreement between the parties as alleged by appellant, also alleged affirmatively that if there were such a writing,
it was procured and signed as a result of fraud
and mistake. The absence of such a finding by the
trial court is an assumed denial of such a fact, and
as it clearly does not prejudice appellant, has no
bearing on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the several writings of the
parties made on May 18, 1955, are by no means clear
and unambiguous on their face. In the light of all
the facts, the finding of the trial court as to the intent of the parties is reasonable.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT

& MABEY

J. COLTON
Attorneys for Respondent
W. H. Adams Carpet Company
ALBERT
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